Strategic thinking for a resilient and competitive Europe

Europe must move past reactive mode and set its own strategy

Left out in the cold by the U.S, Europeans need to decide on their own what end game they want for Ukraine, writes Stefanie Babst.

Trump is erratic and transnational. Sometimes he goes it bit wild. He will push us hard on transatlantic burden-sharing but the recent uptick in our defence expenditures is a good story. We can manage him. After all, the transatlantic relationship has survived his first presidency. We simply need each other.”

In the run-up to Donald Trump’s return to the White House I heard these and similar accounts repeatedly. Yes, many European policymakers and diplomats were nervous but most of them defended their cautiously optimistic expectations.

Alas, in less than a few days Trump and his MAGA movement proved them deadly wrong. Barely minutes after his presidential inauguration he started a full-fledged assault on Washington’s governmental bodies, cutting aid programmes and firing thousands of state employees. Equally shocking, he also launched a disruptive blitz on America’s long-standing allies and partners. He bluntly threatened Canada, Denmark, Panama and Mexico with military force and tariffs. He withdrew his country from the WHO, ICC and the UN Climate Change Conference. To the dismay of Jordan, Egypt and other Middle East countries he proposed to relocate the entire Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile his devoted aid Elon Musk unleashed an unprecedented social media campaign in support of Europe’s right-wing populists, whereas Trump’s Vice-President Vance gave Europeans a grim lecture about the ‘right form of democracy’.

All this is still hard to digest. But nothing has left Europeans more paralyzed than Trump’s decision to align himself with Europe’s most reckless aggressor, Vladimir Putin. His claim to end the bloodshed in Ukraine through a ‘peace deal’ is only a pretext for Trump who aims at a broader reset of U.S.-Russia relations.

The combination of trying to ram his ‘deal’ into Ukrainian and European throats, blackmailing Ukraine with mafia-style manners, excluding Ukrainians and their European backers from the U.S.-Russian talks in Saudi Arabia, siding with Russia and its authoritarian supporters in UN voting and telling Europeans that the United States will no longer guarantee European security have sent shockwaves through the corridors of European governments.

U.S. President Trump’s ambush on President Zelenskyy in the White House on 28 February, seconded by Vice-President Vance, put the current U.S. administration’s mafia-style bullying on full display. A highly uncomfortable moment for the Ukrainian President, it was nevertheless useful since it has hopefully provided a sense of clarity and urgency for Europeans and other U.S. allies. Within less than an hour, Europe’s leaders rallied around Ukraine. Yesterday’s London Summit, hosted by the British Premier Sir Keith Starmer, could have not been timelier.

Can Europeans still influence the Trump’s course of action? The chances are slim. For Trump, the geopolitical planet is a jungle where only those with a tough ‘winner takes it all approach’ survive. He considers the post-1945 international rules-based order dead. So why even pretending to uphold democratic norms and regulations? Enlarging America’s geoeconomic sphere of influence and exploring profitable business deals appear two of Trump’s main objectives. Other policy goals remain fuzzy.

In the past weeks the European response has been shifting between hectic crisis diplomacy to gauge some form of unity and efforts to keep Trump on board; both with a view to Ukraine that continues to fight for survival and the transatlantic security partnership. For many, European security without a strong U.S. military role has been simply unthinkable. This will hopefully change now. They cannot rely any longer on a U.S. President who follows the Kremlin’s speaking points. The spotlight in now on Europe. It must reload itself with full speed.

While the multifaceted strategic ramifications of Washington’s foreign policy U-turn are yet to play out, the most pressing political issues that Europeans and Canadians must tackle now are intertwined. But they all represent formidable challenges in their own right: the future of Ukraine, Europe’s ability to assume responsibility for their own security and the future of NATO and wider transatlantic relations involve highly complex and difficult political questions that still await clear answers.

If Europeans/Canadians will remain in the reactive corner in which Trump has pushed them, uncertainty and unpredictability risk to become predominant drivers of their policies. They must develop their own roadmaps and action plans. Notwithstanding the many wild cards and unknowns that we face, there seem to be at least two fixed variables: first, the Trump administration, supported by the Republican Party and the MAGA movement, is not likely to reconsider its overall political course of action and second, Putin’s Russia’s will continue to pose an existential threat for Ukraine and European security for some time ahead.

Thus, I maintain the view that European/Canadian policymakers should focus their attention on three strategically important issues:

First, contain Russia as robustly and systematically as possible. Whatever ‘peace deal’ or temporary truce the Russians might agree with the Trump administration or surface in a different format, it will not eliminate the existential threat that Russia poses to Ukraine and European security. Under Putin’s rule, Russia will continue to pursue her aggressive imperialistic policy, aimed at altering the balance of power in Europe with military and hybrid force. Limiting Russia’s space of manoeuvre systematically in all domains must therefore be a top strategic priority for Europeans and Canadians, ideally embedded in a long-term, effects-based containment strategy. Thus far, neither the EU nor NATO have developed an overarching containment strategy. Time has come to do so now.

Second, conduct informal contingency-planning for a partial, full, abrupt or orderly U.S. withdrawal from NATO. Trust and predictability are NATO’s blood lines. They have been severely shattered. Whether the Trump administration will uphold its Article 5 commitment in a case of a Russian attack on NATO territory can no longer be taken for granted. Trump will likely not officially abandon NATO. The Alliance remains a useful tool both with a view to his power bargaining with Moscow and Beijing and the global projection of U.S. military power.  But since Trump does not believe per se in multilateralism, he has multiple options to harm the Alliance’s credibility, political cohesion, common funding and defence and deterrence posture. A worst-case scenario for Europeans/Canadians is a decomposed NATO whose consensus-based decision-making becomes paralyzed and military deterrence weakens. Trump’s daily mood and attitudes in bilateral meetings with individual allies are shaky indicators of Washington’s security commitment to Europe. We should prepare for the unthinkable.

And third, ensuring Ukraine’s survival. Providing Ukraine with robust military capacities to continue defending the country against Russia’s military aggression is another key priority. But apart from coordinating timely and military aid and providing a stable financial and economic planning base for Ukrainians, Europeans/Canadians need to find a common view on a fundamental question: What is their strategic end game? Helping Ukraine defeat Russia or accepting a frozen war in the middle of Europe? For the time being, the political focus seems to have shifted towards the second option. But the formula ‘peace through strength’ is as nebulous as ‘we will support Ukraine has long as needed’. How much military, political, or economic strength would Ukraine require to bring Russia to the negotiated table? And is Europe ready to absorb both the multiple consequences of a divided Ukraine and a permanent Russian military forward presence along NATO’s eastern borders?

France, the United Kingdom and Germany must take the lead in tackling these challenging issues. They should seek close alignment with Poland, the Nordic and Baltic countries as well as other European allies and Canada to build a core group that also drives European efforts to upgrade and strengthen their collective defence, resilience and deterrence posture.

Dr. Stefanie Babst is a senior associate fellow at the European Leadership Network. She served 23 years in NATO’s International Staff, including as NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General and Head of the Strategic Foresight Team of the NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the Military Committee. In April 2023, she published her book ‘Blinds Spots – Mustering the courage for a strategy change”.